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THE PROBLEMS OF PROBABLE CAUSE: MENEESE AND THE 
MYTH OF ERODING FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS FOR 
STUDENTS 
  Against the child’s interest in privacy must be set the substantial interest of 
teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on 
school grounds. Maintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but 
in recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug 
use and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems. . . . 
“Events calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require 
immediate, effective action.” Accordingly . . . maintaining security and order 
in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary 
procedures . . . . 
 —Justice Byron White1 
INTRODUCTION 
Twenty-nine years ago in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the United States Supreme 
Court held that school officials may search students when there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect the search will turn up evidence that the student violated the 
law or school policy.2 In other words, “[T]he constitutional rule that a search 
warrant must be [obtained] before a search may be made”3 does not apply 
when school officials search students who are under their authority.4 However, 
the Court expressly refused to decide whether this exception covered school 
resource officers,5 or whether the traditional warrant requirement applied.6 
Since 1985, numerous state and lower federal courts have considered whether 
school resource officers fall within T.L.O.’s “school official” exception, and 
accordingly can conduct searches based on reasonable suspicion, or whether 
such persons must meet the constitutional standard of obtaining a warrant by 
 
 1. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339–40 (1985) (citations omitted). 
 2. Id. at 341–42. 
 3. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 65 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 4. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. 
 5. “Resource officer” is used throughout this Note to refer to commissioned police officers 
who work full-time in schools, regardless of who employs or pays the officer and regardless of 
whether he is armed or in uniform. 
 6. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 n.7. 
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showing probable cause.7 Most cases hold that school resource officers need 
only reasonable suspicion to search students because they are “school 
officials.”8 Recently, however, the Washington Supreme Court decided, in 
State v. Meneese, that a school resource officer acted as “a law enforcement 
officer,” not as a “school official,” and accordingly “required a warrant 
supported by probable cause to search [students].”9 This Note examines the 
analysis, rationale, and practical consequences of Meneese. After examining 
Meneese and its practical consequences, as well as similar cases and the 
existing scholarship, it becomes clear that the probable cause standard is 
unworkable in schools, and that reasonable suspicion should apply to school 
resource officers. 
Part I of this Note explains the facts, rationale, and analysis of T.L.O., 
which is necessary to understand the context of Meneese. Part II examines the 
facts, rationale, and analysis of Meneese. Part III explains how courts 
categorize school search cases, and then dissects cases similar to Meneese—all 
of which hold that reasonable suspicion should be the standard for resource 
officers. Part IV begins the analysis by categorizing Meneese and comparing it 
to these similar cases in Section A. Section B analyzes arguments that support 
probable cause, while focusing heavily on student rights. Section C shows how 
school violence and drug use make the application of probable cause in schools 
unworkable. Part V provides a recommendation for determining whether 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause should apply. Finally, this Note 
concludes with a summary of the most important reasons why reasonable 
suspicion should be the legal standard for school resource officers who search 
students in school. 
 
 7. See Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006); Shade v. 
City of Farmington, Minn., 309 F.3d 1054, 1060 (8th Cir. 2002); Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188, 
193 (8th Cir. 1987); In re William V., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 695, 699–700 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); M.D. v. 
State, 65 So.3d 563, 566 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. 
1996); Martens v. Dist. No. 220, Bd. of Educ., 620 F. Supp. 29, 32 (N.D. Ill. 1985); In re Josue 
T., 989 P.2d 431, 436 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999); Pacheco v. Hopmeier, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1184 
(D.N.M. 2011); In re D.D., 554 S.E.2d 346, 351 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Alaniz, 815 
N.W.2d 234, 240 (N.D. 2012); Commonwealth v. J.B., 719 A.2d 1058, 1062 (Pa. 1998); State v. 
Meneese, 282 P.3d 83, 87 (Wash. 2012) (en banc); State v. Angelia D.B. (In re Interest of 
Angelia D.B.), 564 N.W.2d 682, 688 (Wis. 1997). 
 8. See Bostic, 458 F.3d at 1304; Shade, 309 F.3d at 1060; Cason, 810 F.2d at 193; William 
V., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 699–700; M.D., 65 So.3d at 566; Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d at 317; Martens, 620 
F. Supp. at 32; Josue T., 989 P.2d at 439; D.D., 554 S.E.2d at 351–52; J.B., 719 A.2d at 1062; 
Alaniz, 815 N.W.2d at 239; Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d at 688. 
 9. Meneese, 282 P.3d at 87–88. 
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I.  NEW JERSEY V. T.L.O 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the Fourth 
Amendment10 applied, and if so, how, when public school officials search 
students.11 The case arose after a teacher at Piscataway High School 
discovered T.L.O., a high school freshman, smoking in the restroom.12 
Because smoking in the restroom violated school policy, the teacher took 
T.L.O. to the assistant vice principal.13 When T.L.O. denied smoking, the 
principal demanded to see her purse.14 He opened the purse and discovered a 
pack of cigarettes and a package of rolling papers.15 The principal believed 
rolling papers were associated with the use of marijuana, so he decided to more 
thoroughly search the purse.16 The search yielded marijuana, a pipe, empty 
plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money, and an index card and two letters 
that implicated T.L.O. in marijuana distribution.17 After the Juvenile Court 
denied her motion to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, 
T.L.O. was convicted of drug distribution.18 Although the state appellate court 
affirmed the finding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that even if reasonable suspicion was the 
proper standard, the principal did not have reasonable suspicion because he 
lacked specific information that cigarettes were in T.L.O.’s purse.19 The State 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.20 
B. The Court’s Analysis 
The Supreme Court noted that the Fourth21 and Fourteenth22 Amendments 
to the Federal Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by state 
 
 10. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 11. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 332–33. 
 12. Id. at 328. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 329–30. 
 19. Id. at 330–31. 
 20. Id. at 331. 
 21. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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officers, including public school officials.23 The Court said that while school 
children have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the personal effects they 
bring to school, school administrators have a “substantial interest . . . in 
maintaining discipline . . . on school grounds.”24 The Court explained that “in 
recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use 
and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems.”25 As a 
result, the Court said: 
The warrant requirement . . . is unsuited to the school environment: requiring 
a . . . warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules 
(or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the 
swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.26 
Although recognizing that students have protected privacy interests, the 
Court said that the potential danger in schools and the substantial need to 
maintain order does not require strict adherence to the rule that searches be 
based on probable cause.27 Rather, school officials may search students if it is 
reasonable under all the circumstances, which is determined by considering (1) 
whether “the action was justified at its inception,” and (2) whether it was 
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place.”28 A search is justified at its inception when 
“there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up 
evidence that the student has violated . . . either the law or the rules of the 
school.”29 It is permissible in scope when the measures are “reasonably related 
to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age 
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”30 
The Court reasoned that the search was justified at its inception because if 
T.L.O. smoked and possessed cigarettes, she would most likely carry them in 
her purse.31 Thus, finding cigarettes in her purse would corroborate the claim 
that she violated school policy by smoking in the restroom.32 Additionally, the 
search was permissible in scope because the rolling papers in plain view gave 
the principal reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. was carrying marijuana in 
 
 22. “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 23. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334. 
 24. Id. at 339. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 340. 
 27. Id. at 341. 
 28. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. 
 29. Id. at 341–42. 
 30. Id. at 342. 
 31. Id. at 345–46. 
 32. Id. at 345. 
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addition to the cigarettes.33 Therefore, the Court concluded that “the search for 
mari[j]uana [was not] unreasonable in any respect.”34 
Significantly, however, the Court expressly declined to decide “the 
appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school 
officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies.”35 
That omission has placed the burden on state courts and lower federal courts to 
decide which standard applies to school resource officers.36 
II.  STATE V. MENEESE 
One of the most recent cases that considered which standard applies to 
school resource officers was the 2012 case of State v. Meneese, which departed 
from the trend and ultimately held that searches by school resource officers 
require a warrant supported by probable cause.37 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
Officer Fry, a law enforcement officer employed by the Bellevue Police 
Department, worked at the local high school as a school resource officer since 
the late 1990s.38 In consideration for his services, and those of five other 
officers, the school paid the police department $90,000 per year.39 Officer Fry 
was required to “create and maintain a safe, secure, and orderly learning 
environment for students, teachers, and staff, through prevention and 
intervention techniques.”40 He could not administer school discipline, 
suspensions, or expulsions, and he drove a marked police car to and from 
school.41 He wore a standard issued police uniform, and “on a rare occasion,” 
he assisted other officers with incidents unrelated to his duties at the school.42 
One day, Officer Fry walked into the restroom and discovered Meneese 
standing at the sink holding a bag of marijuana and a medical vial.43 He 
confiscated the marijuana and escorted Meneese and his backpack to the 
dean’s office.44 Once there, Fry arrested Meneese and requested a patrol car to 
 
 33. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 341 n.7. 
 36. See Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188, 193 (8th Cir. 1987); M.D. v. State, 65 So.3d 563, 566 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. 1996); Pacheco v. 
Hopmeier, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1184 (D.N.M. 2011). 
 37. State v. Meneese, 282 P.3d 83, 88, 90 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
 38. Id. at 84–85 (majority opinion). 
 39. Id. at 85. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Meneese, 282 P.3d at 85. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
594 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:589 
transport Meneese to the police station.45 While waiting for the patrol car, Fry 
noticed Meneese’s backpack was padlocked, which made him suspicious that 
the backpack contained additional contraband.46 When he asked for the key, 
Meneese claimed he left it at home.47 This made Fry more suspicious, so he 
handcuffed and searched Meneese, found the key, and, upon searching the 
backpack, discovered a BB gun.48 Meneese was then charged with carrying a 
dangerous weapon at school.49 After the trial and appellate courts ruled that the 
T.L.O. school exception50 applied and denied his motion to suppress, Meneese 
appealed to the Washington Supreme Court, arguing that Fry lacked the 
necessary search warrant.51 
B. The Washington Supreme Court’s Analysis 
Although the court acknowledged T.L.O.52 as binding, it concluded that “in 
light of the overwhelming indicia of police action, Fry was a law enforcement 
officer,” and therefore, the school exception did not apply.53 The majority 
claimed the holding was guided by the school exception rationales that (1) 
“teachers and administrators have a substantial interest ‘in maintaining 
discipline . . . on school grounds’ that often requires swift action” and that (2) 
the warrant requirement is “particularly ‘unsuited to the school 
environment.’”54 The court claimed to recognize that “the extra burden of 
requiring a warrant for school searches undermines the need for swift 
discipline to maintain order, the very purpose behind the search” and that the 
“holding is contrary to several . . . jurisdictions that have [considered the 
issue].”55 However, the court cited only one case and one secondary source in 
support of its holding that school resource officers are “police officers” who 
require probable cause in order to search.56 
The court relied on a formalistic consideration of four factors in 
concluding that Fry was a police officer, not a school official. First, the court 
said Fry was a uniformed police officer that was employed to control crime, 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Meneese, 282 P.3d at 85. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). 
 51. Meneese, 282 P.3d at 85. 
 52. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325. 
 53. Meneese, 282 P.3d at 86, 88. 
 54. Id. at 86. 
 55. Id. at 86–87. 
 56. Id. at 87 (citing Patman v. State, 537 S.E.2d 118 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Jacqueline A. 
Stefkovich & Judith A. Miller, Law Enforcement Officers in Public Schools: Student Citizens in 
Safe Havens?, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 25, 67–69 (1999)). 
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not to administer school discipline.57 Second, the court noted that Fry arrested 
and handcuffed Meneese before searching his backpack.58 The court then 
asserted, without authority, that “[a]n ordinary school official could not have 
arrested a student [if the student was caught with a bag of marijuana] and, most 
likely, could not have handcuffed a student either.”59 Since Meneese was 
already under arrest, the court rationalized that “there was no need for swift 
discipline to maintain order.”60 Third, the court said the search of Meneese was 
unrelated to education or safety because it occurred after he was arrested, 
unlike in other cases where a pre-arrest search was conducted to protect the 
school environment.61 The court argued that because the search was unrelated 
to education, the policy behind the school exception did not apply.62 Finally, 
the court relied on the fact that the city, not the school, employed Fry.63 
C. The Dissent 
The dissent joined the majority of jurisdictions that have considered the 
issue and concluded that reasonable suspicion should apply to school resource 
officers due to the special nature of the school environment.64 Essentially, 
Justice Stephens wrote, schools “simply delegate[] their recognized authority 
to resource officers who, by virtue of their training, are adept at detecting 
misbehavior and maintaining order.”65 The dissent concluded that school 
resource officers may search students “so long as it is related to school policy 
and not merely a subterfuge for unrelated law enforcement activities.”66 Justice 
Stephens attacked the majority for its four-factor analysis, and explored the 
policy implications of the majority decision.67 
First, he argued that “whether one qualifies as a school official should not 
depend on dressing the part.”68 Rather, the fact that Fry was a uniformed police 
officer without power to discipline students was irrelevant, especially because 
only the superintendent had that power.69 The dissent essentially argued that, 
under the majority’s analysis, only the superintendent was a “school official” 
because only he could discipline students. Second, the majority’s assertion that 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Meneese, 282 P.3d at 87. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 88. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Meneese, 282 P.3d at 88. 
 64. Id. at 88, 95 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
 65. Id. at 91. 
 66. Id. at 88. 
 67. Id. at 90–94. 
 68. Meneese, 282 P.3d at 91 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. 
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school officials could not detain or handcuff students was incorrect. “[S]chool 
officials can detain or handcuff students in certain circumstances.”70 For 
example, if a student possessed the amount of marijuana that Meneese did, 
then “teachers and school staff may forcibly restrain the student.”71 Third, the 
fact that Meneese was under arrest and was to be transported to the police 
station was not relevant to the analysis. As the Supreme Court noted in T.L.O., 
a school search is justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that a student violated the law.72 Clearly—whether or not Meneese 
was under arrest—Fry had reasonable suspicion to believe Meneese violated 
the law when he observed him holding a bag of marijuana.73 Next, the dissent 
discredited the majority’s view that the search was unrelated to education. The 
majority noted the “unchallenged finding . . . that Fry’s primary duty [was] to 
‘help the school district meet its goal of . . . maintaining a safe, secure, and 
orderly learning environment.’”74 In that role, Fry’s search was “in accordance 
with school disciplinary policy and was an expected, ‘normal part’ of any 
search of a student caught with drugs.”75 Obviously, a school employee could 
have unilaterally searched the bag, so requiring a resource officer to obtain a 
warrant to search the same bag was illogical, especially when he was in the 
presence of the dean.76 
The dissent also suggested that policy considerations undercut the 
majority’s approach. Justice Stephens noted that the probable cause standard 
for resource officers will “encourage teachers and school officials, who 
generally are untrained in proper pat down procedures . . . to conduct a search 
of a student suspected of carrying a dangerous weapon . . . without the 
assistance of a school liaison officer.”77 Additionally, because the majority’s 
analysis gives resource officers less authority than teachers to enforce 
regulations and investigate misconduct, schools have no incentive to even 
employ resource officers because teachers could more easily conduct 
searches.78 Rather, schools will resort to assigning untrained, non-law 
enforcement personnel to police the halls, which is “an expenditure of 
resources schools can ill afford.”79 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 92. 
 72. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985). 
 73. Meneese, 282 P.3d at 93 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 92–93. 
 75. Id. at 93. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 94. 
 78. Meneese, 282 P.3d at 93 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. 
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Finally, the dissent tied its conclusion to the fact that schools have a legal 
duty to protect students.80 Yet, “[o]ne need not ‘search beyond recent . . . 
headlines to understand that schools are . . . often turned into places in which 
children are subjected to grave and even life-threatening dangers wherein the 
split-second vigilance of teachers and administrators . . . is absolutely 
critical.’”81 The argument is, in effect, that a violent catastrophe could 
potentially erupt in the time it takes to obtain a warrant. 
III.  SIMILAR CASES 
The context of Meneese cannot be understood without considering some 
similar cases and exploring the distinctions that exist between them. There are 
three types of cases where a student challenges as unconstitutional a search of 
his person or property.82 First, T.L.O.’s reasonable suspicion standard83 is 
applied when a school employee conducts a search unilaterally, or where 
school resource officer involvement is minimal.84 The same reasonable 
suspicion standard is applied in the second category of cases where a school 
resource officer, acting on his own initiative or under his own authority, 
unilaterally searches a student.85 Under the third category,86 courts apply the 
probable cause standard when an “outside”87 police officer initiates a search as 
part of his or her own investigation, or when school officials act at the behest 
of such officers.88 
The following is a brief overview of cases in the first two categories. 
Meneese most likely falls into the second category89 because the resource 
 
 80. Id. at 88–89. 
 81. Id. at 89 (citing Knox Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 378 
n.23 (6th Cir. 1998)). 
 82. In re Josue T., 989 P.2d 431, 436 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). 
 83. See supra notes 21–36 and accompanying text. 
 84. Josue T., 989 P.2d at 436. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Because Meneese involved a school resource officer contracted by the school, the third 
category of cases where “outside” police officers are involved is factually distinguishable. As a 
result, this category is not discussed in this Article. For an example of this type of case, see F.P. 
v. State, 528 So.2d 1253, 1255 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the school exception to the 
probable cause requirement did not apply when a school resource officer searched a student at the 
direction of an “outside” police officer who was on school grounds only to investigate an 
unrelated burglary). 
 87. “Outside” police officer is used throughout this article to refer to police officers who are 
not school resource officers, but who are “traditional” police officers that patrol neighborhoods, 
investigate crimes in the community, and respond to distress calls. These “outside” police officers 
are not employed or contracted by the schools, and they have no connection to, or responsibility 
for, the school environment (other than the presence of the school in the city the officer serves). 
 88. Josue T., 989 P.2d at 436–37. 
 89. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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officer unilaterally initiated the investigation and conducted the search.90 
However, one could arguably place Meneese into the first category91 because 
the dean was present when the resource officer conducted the search.92 As will 
be seen, though, whether Meneese is a category one or two case is not relevant 
because courts apply reasonable suspicion in both circumstances. Because 
Meneese is undoubtedly not a category three case, the court should have 
applied reasonable suspicion. 
A. Category One—Minimal Police Involvement 
In re Josue T.93 falls into the first category of cases. There, the school was 
assigned an armed and uniformed resource officer who was employed by the 
local police department.94 One day, a school employee noticed the odor of 
marijuana emanating from a student.95 To investigate possible drug possession, 
the employee interviewed students who rode to school with that particular 
student, including the defendant.96 When the defendant was removed from 
class, he was evasive and smelled of marijuana.97 It was at this point that the 
resource officer joined the school employee, and they escorted the student to 
the employee’s office.98 They noticed that the student was atypically quiet, 
kept his hands in his pocket, and had a large object in his pocket.99 At the 
employee’s office, the employee notified the defendant that he would be 
searched and instructed him to empty his pockets.100 Despite repeated requests, 
the defendant refused to empty his pocket or remove his hand from the 
pocket.101 The employee then became concerned about safety, and instructed 
the resource officer to search the defendant.102 The officer reached into the 
defendant’s pocket, and discovered a firearm.103 After the trial court denied the 
defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, he was convicted of unlawfully 
carrying a firearm.104 
 
 90. State v. Meneese, 282 P.3d 83, 85 (Wash. 2012) (en banc). 
 91. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 92. Meneese, 282 P.3d at 85. 
 93. Josue T., 989 P.2d at 431. 
 94. Id. at 434. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Josue T., 989 P.2d at 434. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Josue T., 989 P.2d at 434. 
 104. Id. 
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In holding that reasonable suspicion applied when school employees 
initiate an investigation, the court noted that any other conclusion would be 
illogical and dangerous.105 Specifically, the court said a probable cause 
standard would encourage teachers, who are untrained in pat-down procedures 
and in neutralizing dangerous weapons, to unilaterally search students.106 The 
court relied on the fact that the officer merely assisted the school employee to 
protect student welfare, and that the employee, not the resource officer, 
initiated and conducted the entire investigation.107 In fact, the resource officer 
became involved only after the employee rightfully became concerned about 
safety.108 The court concluded that the search was justified at its inception 
because the defendant was suspected of possessing marijuana and because he 
refused to empty his pockets.109 The search was also permissible in scope 
because it was limited to the pocket where the large bulge was located.110 
State v. Angelia D.B.111 also falls into the first category of cases. As in 
Meneese and In re Josue T., it involved a city-employed resource officer.112 
When a student informed the assistant principal that there might be a knife 
concealed in the defendant’s backpack, the principal called the resource 
officer.113 The officer and the dean of students escorted the defendant out of 
class, where the officer patted her down.114 They also looked inside her 
backpack and searched her locker according to school policy.115 When these 
searches yielded nothing illegal, the officer searched the defendant’s jacket, 
and lifted the bottom of her shirt.116 The officer discovered a knife tucked 
inside the defendant’s waistband.117 After the trial court suppressed the 
evidence, the State appealed and the court of appeals certified the question for 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.118 
In holding that reasonable suspicion applied when resource officers act in 
conjunction with school authorities, the court noted that students have a 
reduced expectation of privacy at school.119 Additionally, because school 
attendance is compulsory, schools have a heightened duty to protect students 
 
 105. Id. at 437. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Josue T., 989 P.2d at 437. 
 109. Id. at 438. 
 110. Id. at 439. 
 111. State v. Angelia D.B. (In re Interest of Angelia D.B.), 564 N.W.2d 682 (Wis. 1997). 
 112. Id. at 684. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d at 684. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 684–85. 
 119. Id. at 689. 
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from danger.120 Accordingly, probable cause, if the standard, would promote 
the unreasonable risk of encouraging untrained teachers to search students 
suspected of possessing dangerous weapons.121 Therefore, under the 
reasonable suspicion standard, the search was justified at its inception because 
a student witnessed the defendant with a knife.122 The scope of the search was 
also permissible because the officer only searched for the reported knife, and 
only searched places where the defendant could have reasonably concealed the 
knife.123 
B. Category Two—Resource Officer Acting Unilaterally 
Although the dean in Meneese was present when the officer conducted the 
search, Meneese falls within the second category because the officer 
unilaterally initiated the investigation and conducted the search.124 As will be 
shown, though, courts apply the same reasonable suspicion standard in 
category two cases, even when resource officers search students under their 
own authority, without the direction of school employees.125 
In re William V.126 is a category two case. There, a city-employed resource 
officer worked in uniform at the school full-time.127 As the officer walked 
down the hallway, he observed the defendant with a bandanna hanging from 
the back of his pants, which often signified gang affiliations and violated 
school policy.128 When the defendant noticed the officer, he became nervous, 
started pacing, and denied knowing that he had a bandanna.129 Because the 
defendant violated school policy, the officer planned to take him to the 
principal’s office.130 Before doing so, however, the officer patted down the 
defendant because he believed, based on his experience, that the bandanna 
signified an imminent confrontation.131 During the pat down, the officer 
detected a bulge in the defendant’s waistband, and then lifted his shirt and 
discovered a knife.132 After he was convicted, the defendant appealed the trial 
court’s denial of his motion to suppress the knife.133 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d at 690. 
 122. Id. at 691. 
 123. Id. at 692. 
 124. State v. Meneese, 282 P.3d 83, 85 (Wash. 2012) (en banc). 
 125. In re Josue T., 989 P.2d 431, 436 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). 
 126. In re William V., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 695 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 127. Id. at 696–97. 
 128. Id. at 697. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. William V., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 697. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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The court held that, regardless of where the officer was employed, the need 
to preserve order and safety did not permit a standard of probable cause, even 
when a resource officer acted unilaterally.134 The court rejected the argument 
that a distinction existed between resource officers and school personnel 
because that would mean “the extent of a student’s rights would depend not on 
the nature of the asserted infringement but on the . . . status of the employee 
who . . . investigated the misconduct.”135 The court said this distinction was 
irrational and that the relationship between students and school police was no 
different simply because the officer was employed by the city, not the 
school.136 Additionally, the court noted that if school resource officers had less 
authority than school employees to investigate, there would be no reason for 
schools to employ or delegate their safety responsibilities to resource 
officers.137 After determining that the resource officer was a “school official” 
and that reasonable suspicion was the standard, the court said the search was 
justified because the bandanna violated school policy and likely symbolized an 
imminent confrontation.138 Additionally, the search was permissible in scope 
because it was limited to the waistband.139 
People v. Dilworth140 also falls into the second category of cases. The 
school liaison officer, like in Meneese and In re William V., was employed by 
the city but assigned to the school—in this case an alternative school.141 He 
had arrest power and could also give detentions, but not suspensions.142 One 
day, two teachers asked him to search a student that they overheard talking 
about drugs.143 After the search yielded nothing illegal, the officer escorted the 
defendant back to his locker.144 At this point, the officer observed the 
defendant and another student giggling and looking at him as if he had been 
“played for a fool.”145 The officer then noticed a flashlight in the defendant’s 
hand, which the officer thought violated school policy and could potentially 
contain drugs.146 The officer then unilaterally grabbed the flashlight, 
unscrewed the top, and discovered cocaine.147 After his motion to suppress the 
 
 134. Id. at 698. 
 135. Id. at 699 (quoting In re Randy G., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516, 526 (2001)). 
 136. William V., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 699. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 700–01. 
 139. Id. at 701. 
 140. People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. 1996). 
 141. Id. at 313. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d at 313. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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cocaine was denied, the defendant appealed.148 When the appeals court 
reversed, the State appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.149 
The court held that reasonable suspicion applies when a school resource 
officer conducts a search under his own initiative and authority.150 The court 
reached this conclusion because “[s]tudents within the school environment 
have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population 
generally.”151 Additionally, the court noted that the officer had individualized 
suspicion that drugs were in the flashlight, and that schools have a substantial 
interest in maintaining schools free from “the ravages of drugs.”152 The court 
also rejected any assertion that probable cause should apply because the city, 
not the school, employed the officer.153 Based on the reasonable suspicion 
standard, the court concluded that the search was justified because two 
teachers overheard the defendant state that he possessed drugs, and because the 
defendant possessed a container that could be used to conceal drugs.154 It was 
also permissible in scope because the officer limited his search to the 
flashlight, which is where he believed that drugs were concealed.155 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A. The Trend of Similar Cases 
As stated above, Meneese likely falls within the second category156 
because the school resource officer unilaterally discovered and searched the 
student without the involvement of school employees.157 However, one might 
argue that it falls within the first category158 because the dean was present 
during the resource officer’s search.159 However, whether Meneese is a 
category one or two case is not legally significant because the same legal 
standard applies. The trend is clear that the reasonable suspicion standard 
applies in category one cases, such as Josue T.160 and Angelia D.B.,161 and in 
 
 148. Id. at 314. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d at 317. 
 151. Id. at 320 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 341, 348 (1985)). 
 152. Id. at 318. 
 153. Id. at 320. 
 154. Id. at 321. 
 155. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d at 321. 
 156. In re Josue T., 989 P.2d 431, 436 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). 
 157. State v. Meneese, 282 P.3d 83, 85 (Wash. 2012) (en banc). 
 158. Josue T., 989 P.2d at 436. 
 159. Meneese, 282 P.3d at 85. 
 160. Josue T., 989 P.2d at 431. 
 161. State v. Angelia D.B. (In re Interest of Angelia D.B.), 564 N.W.2d 682 (Wis. 1997). 
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category two cases,162 such as William V.163 and Dilworth.164 It is equally clear 
that Meneese is not a category three case,165 where probable cause should 
apply, because no “outside” police officers initiated the search as a part of their 
own investigation, nor did Officer Fry or the dean act at the behest of “outside” 
officers.166 Fry was not an “outside” officer because he was a school resource 
officer who was contracted by the school to work full-time at the school.167 He 
did not act at the behest of “outside” officers because he unilaterally walked 
into the bathroom, discovered Meneese with marijuana, then escorted him to 
the dean’s office before he searched his backpack.168 
Because Meneese falls into one of the first two categories,169 the court 
should not have departed from the clear trend by applying the probable cause 
standard. Rather, the court should have conducted a T.L.O. reasonableness 
analysis.170 Had the court done this, it would have found that the search was 
justified at its inception because there were reasonable grounds to believe that 
the search would produce evidence that Meneese violated the law.171 Officer 
Fry caught him with marijuana in plain view and then noticed that the 
backpack was locked with apparently no key in sight.172 Such a claim would 
certainly give rise to suspicion that the backpack contained additional 
contraband, especially because, without a key, the student would be unable to 
access his books and notes inside the backpack. Additionally, the court would 
have found that the search was permissible in scope because it was reasonably 
related to the objective of the search.173 The objective of the search was to 
seize and remove illegal contraband from school property.174 The search was 
clearly related to this objective because Fry limited the search to the place 
where he reasonably believed Meneese concealed additional contraband. Had 
the court applied the correct standard, it would have found that the search was 
reasonable and affirmed Meneese’s conviction. 
 
 162. Josue T., 989 P.2d at 436. 
 163. In re William V., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 695 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 164. People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. 1996). 
 165. Josue T., 989 P.2d at 436. 
 166. State v. Meneese, 282 P.3d 83, 84–85 (Wash. 2012) (en banc). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 85. 
 169. Josue T., 989 P.2d at 436. 
 170. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Meneese, 282 P.3d at 85. 
 173. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342. 
 174. Meneese, 282 P.3d at 85. 
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B. Student Rights 
While it is evident that the Meneese court departed from the clear trend by 
applying the probable cause standard, one must also consider whether probable 
cause should be the preferred standard. While most courts readily apply 
reasonable suspicion to school settings, the academic literature to date argues 
forcefully for probable cause. This section examines various problems that 
would arise from a standard of probable cause in school settings, while 
pointing out why reasonable suspicion should be preferred. 
In 1999, Andrea Bough asserted that “no clear case law exists” as to 
whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion should apply to school 
resource officers.175 A few months later, Josue T., which contained the court’s 
explanation of the three categories of cases, was decided.176 If no clear case 
law existed in 1999, it certainly does in 2014. The trend is now clear—
notwithstanding Meneese, courts almost universally apply the reasonable 
suspicion standard to school resource officers when no “outside” officers are 
involved.177 
Based on her assertion that “no clear case law exists,” Ms. Bough argued 
that probable cause should apply in schools much of the time.178 In support of 
this argument, she said that because resource officers work full-time in 
schools, they develop relationships with students and learn their behavioral 
patterns.179 As a result, she said, it will be easy for resource officers to develop 
probable cause.180 While this may be true, Ms. Bough ignores the essence of 
the Fourth Amendment—that when probable cause is the standard, “no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation.”181 In other words, regardless of how easily a resource officer can 
develop probable cause, he or she will still have to wait an unreasonable 
amount of time—at least in the educational environment where “swift and 
 
 175. Andrea G. Bough, Searches and Seizures in Schools: Should Reasonable Suspicion or 
Probable Cause Apply to School Resource/Liaison Officers?, 67 UMKC L. REV. 543, 544 
(1999). 
 176. In re Josue T., 989 P.2d 431, 436–37 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). The case clearly explained 
that there are three categories of cases, as well as how courts treat cases from each category. Id. 
First, reasonable suspicion is applied when school employees unilaterally conduct the search, or 
when police involvement is minimal. Id. at 436. Second, reasonable suspicion is applied when 
school resource officers unilaterally conduct the search under their own authority. Id. Third, 
probable cause is applied when “outside” police officers conduct a search, or when school 
employees or resource officers search at the behest of “outside” police officers. Id. at 436–37. 
 177. See discussion supra Part III and supra note 8. 
 178. Bough, supra note 175, at 544, 563. 
 179. Id. at 546–47. 
 180. Id. at 547. 
 181. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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informal disciplinary procedures [are] needed”182—for a warrant to issue.183 
This greater need for swiftness in the educational environment, as opposed to 
other environments, comes from the “responsibility [of schools] to protect 
student safety and preserve an orderly educational environment.”184 Ms. Bough 
also argued that, in many situations, school officials should not delegate their 
responsibility to school resource officers.185 Rather, “[i]f there is suspicion of 
criminal activity, school officials should be the primary figures in conducting 
an investigation.”186 The problem with prohibiting teachers from delegating 
their safety responsibilities, though, is that it would create situations where 
“teachers . . . who are generally untrained in proper pat down procedures or in 
neutralizing dangerous weapons . . . conduct a search . . . without the 
assistance of a school resource officer” and therefore would place teachers 
unnecessarily in danger.187 
Ms. Bough also suggested that the determination of which standard applies 
should depend on where the officer is employed, while at the same time she 
argued that the place of the officer’s assignment is irrelevant.188 The argument 
appears to be that if the school employs the resource officer, then reasonable 
suspicion should apply because he or she is responsible to the school.189 If, 
however, he or she is employed by the city or some other entity, then probable 
cause should apply because the officer is responsible only to that entity.190 A 
few sentences later, the article stated that reasonable suspicion should not 
apply merely based on the officer’s assignment at a school because that would 
somehow be arbitrary.191 
There are several problems with basing the determination of which 
standard applies on employment status. First, assuming that it is arbitrary to 
base the determination on the officer’s assignment, it is no less arbitrary to 
base the same determination on who hired the officer and signs his paycheck. 
Second, there is authority, for example In re William V., that rejects the 
proposition that the standard should be determined by who employs the 
officer.192 The dissent in Meneese also expressly rejected this distinction, 
 
 182. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985). 
 183. See discussion infra Part IV.0. 
 184. State v. Meneese, 282 P.3d 83, 88–89 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
 185. Bough, supra note 175, at 563. 
 186. Id. 
 187. State v. Angelia D.B. (In re Interest of Angelia D.B.), 564 N.W.2d 682, 690 (Wis. 1997). 
 188. Bough, supra note 175, at 561–62. 
 189. Id. at 561. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 562. 
 192. See In re William V., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 695, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (there is no 
difference in the relationship between the student and school-employed officers and between the 
student and city-employed officers who work full-time at the school). 
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stating that who paid the officer’s salary is a constitutionally insignificant 
factor that causes one to lose sight of the officer’s function at the school and of 
the special nature of the school.193 However, even if the “who-paid” distinction 
were adopted, the Meneese court still got it wrong. Although Officer Fry was 
technically employed by the city, the school district paid the police department 
$90,000 per year in consideration for his services, as well as those of other 
resource officers.194 In this way, the school district did pay Fry, albeit 
indirectly. Therefore, even if the “who-paid” distinction were adopted, there is 
a legitimate argument that reasonable suspicion applied to Fry. 
The final problem is the implicit assumption that officers who are not 
employed by the school are not responsible to it. Fry was under contract with 
the school district, and had a contractual obligation to “creat[e] and maintain[] 
a safe, secure, and orderly learning environment for students, teachers, and 
staff, through prevention and intervention techniques.”195 As a result, although 
Fry was responsible to the police department, he was also accountable to the 
school district because he had a legal obligation to protect both the students 
and their learning environment. 
Ms. Bough’s most significant and seriously flawed argument is her 
assertion that reasonable suspicion will inevitably lead to the erosion of 
students’ constitutional rights.196 This contention, originally argued in the 
Dilworth dissent,197 requires careful consideration, and makes it necessary to 
examine the constitutional rights of students. It has long been established that 
“students do not shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”198 
At the same time, “students in school do not possess the same breadth of 
constitutional rights as parties in other settings.”199 Although students retain 
constitutional rights in school, those rights are “limited by the circumstances of 
[the school’s] special environment.”200 
For example, students have reduced freedom of speech rights while in 
school.201 Similarly, students have reduced freedom of the press rights.202 
 
 193. State v. Meneese, 282 P.3d 83, 93 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (Stephens, J., dissenting) 
(citing William V., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 695). 
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 196. Bough, supra note 175, at 561–62. 
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 198. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Tinker v. 
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 493 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
 199. M.D. v. State, 65 So.3d 563, 565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 200. Pethtel v. Dennison, No. 2.07-CV-62, 2008 WL 859034, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 
2008). 
 201. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683–84 (1986) (holding that schools 
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While no student has brought suit asserting the right to assemble, it is unlikely 
that any court would give students the freedom to assemble in the hallway (or 
anywhere other than his or her assigned classroom) during the school day 
while classes are in session. Additionally, students have limited freedom of 
religion rights.203 In fact, the only First Amendment204 right that students seem 
to universally possess is the freedom to petition. As for the Second 
Amendment,205 it is without question that students enjoy no right to possess 
firearms while at school.206 Additionally, students have reduced Fourth 
Amendment207 rights in school,208 and have no Twenty-first Amendment209 
right to possess alcohol in school.210 Finally, students, until they reach the 
required statutory age, are required to attend school, and thus lack the freedom 
to do as they please while school is in session.211 
 
 202. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that schools may 
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 210. State v. E.K.P., 255 P.3d 870, 871 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming the conviction of a 
student who was convicted of possessing alcohol at school). 
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In short, it is accepted that students, as minors in a compulsory educational 
system, do not and cannot enjoy the same constitutional rights as their older 
counterparts. Applying the reasonable suspicion standard to school resource 
officers—the same standard that courts readily apply to school employees—
does not erode the rights of students. Rather, the reasonable suspicion standard 
is entirely consistent with the other constitutional rights that students enjoy.212 
It will not produce a slippery-slope or erode student rights, just as limiting the 
right of students to use abusive language in school has not produced a slippery-
slope of silencing student speech or of eroding student rights.213 Instead, just as 
limiting abusive language in schools protects minor students from such 
language, applying a reasonable suspicion standard in schools protects children 
from violence and drug use that, unfortunately, so often accompanies public 
school systems.214 
C. School Violence and Drugs 
In T.L.O. the Supreme Court recognized the most important reason why 
probable cause should not apply to school searches. The Court stated that “in 
recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use 
and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems.”215 
Unfortunately, the trend of drugs and violence in schools continues twenty-
nine years later. This section examines current school violence and drug 
problems, explores arguments that promote probable cause despite these 
problems, and explains why reasonable suspicion is the better standard for 
schools. 
A 2012 Center for Disease Control survey revealed that twelve percent of 
students engaged in a physical fight on school property within the previous 
year, while nearly six percent did not go to school one or more days within the 
previous month because they felt unsafe at school.216 Even more troublesome, 
nearly five and one-half percent of students carried a gun, knife, or club to 
school within the month prior to the survey, and nearly seven and one-half 
percent were threatened or physically injured with such a weapon on school 
property within the prior year.217 The Center for Disease Control also 
calculated that between 1999 and 2006, 116 students were killed in 109 
 
 212. See supra notes 198–211 and accompanying text. 
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separate incidents, with sixty-five percent of those homicides resulting from a 
gunshot wound.218 
During the 1990s, there were numerous school shootings in the United 
States. A small sample of these incidents include Luke Woodham, who 
murdered his mother before killing two students at school in Pearl, Mississippi 
in 1997; Andrew Golden and Mitchell Johnson, who killed one teacher and 
four students in Jonesboro, Arkansas in 1998; and Eric Harris and Dylan 
Klebold, who killed a teacher and twelve students, while injuring numerous 
others, at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado in 1999.219 This trend 
has also continued into the twenty-first century. For example, Jeffery Weise 
killed nine people, including his grandfather, in school in Red Lake, Minnesota 
in 2005; Charles Carl Roberts IV killed five girls execution style in a 
schoolhouse before taking his own life in Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania in 
2006;220 Seung-Hui Cho killed thirty-three people on the campus of Virginia 
Tech in 2007;221 and Adam Lanza killed twenty-seven people, including 
twenty students, in Newtown, Connecticut in 2012.222 
Nor has student drug use subsided since 1985. The Boston Globe recently 
quoted one superintendent who said “[d]rugs are everywhere—in the smaller 
schools, rich towns, poor towns, urban, and suburban. If you want it, it’s 
there.”223 Another superintendent indicated that drugs are the “biggest obstacle 
that . . . schools face.”224 In fact, twenty five percent of students in one high 
school admitted to using marijuana.225 The U.S. News recently reported that 
seventeen percent of students abuse drugs during the school day, forty-four 
percent of high school students know a fellow student who sells drugs at 
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school, and sixty-one percent of students report that their schools are “drug 
infected.”226 Additionally, one Missouri school district suspended sixty-eight 
high school students between 2011 and 2012 for violating the district’s drug 
and alcohol policy.227 
Despite the incredible prevalence of guns, violence, and drugs in American 
schools, many still argue that the Fourth Amendment should apply equally 
inside and outside of schools.228 Put differently, many people believe the 
applicability of the warrant requirement should not depend on one’s status as a 
student. The arguments advanced in support of the warrant requirement, 
though, are seriously flawed, and undermine the conclusion that probable 
cause should apply. For example, Donald Beci argues that students will learn 
more about the dichotomy of public safety and individual liberty by watching 
backpack searches than they will by reading about the Constitution.229 The 
argument is that, by witnessing and living what Mr. Beci views as the 
suppression of student rights, students will grow to suppress the rights of 
others. However, as noted above, the reasonable suspicion standard does not 
suppress student rights—it is merely consistent with the other rights that 
students enjoy.230 Additionally, even if one were to equate the reasonable 
suspicion standard with the suppression of student rights, there is no evidence 
that students will mature to suppress the rights of others. It is equally possible 
that the education system will work—that students will learn to identify and 
remedy injustices. 
Mr. Beci also attacked the reasonable suspicion standard using a slippery-
slope argument. He questioned whether reasonable suspicion would apply to 
parents who are on school grounds for legitimate purposes.231 In other words, 
he questioned whether a teacher or resource officer could search a parent at 
school with only reasonable suspicion. The answer, though, is obvious. Courts 
should employ a bright-line test so that all teachers, officers, and 
administrators can easily identify which standard applies.232 If students are 
present—even just one student—the school’s legal duty to protect them 
remains, even if an adult poses the threat. As a result, reasonable suspicion 
 
 226. Amanda Gardner, Many Teens Drinking, Taking Drugs During School: Survey, U.S. 
NEWS (August 22, 2012), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/news/articles/2012/08/22/many-
teens-drinking-taking-drugs-during-school-survey. 
 227. Mary Shapiro, Parkway District Gives OK to Canine Drug Searches, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 26, 2012, http://www.stltoday.com/suburban-journals/metro/education/parkway-
district-gives-ok-to-canine-drug-searches/article_efeb157c-2f7c-5560-be82-a23a83b1f45a.html. 
 228. Donald L. Beci, School Violence: Protecting our Children and the Fourth Amendment, 
41 CATH. U. L. REV. 817, 835 (1992). 
 229. Id. 
 230. See supra notes 198–211 and accompanying text. 
 231. Beci, supra note 228, at 835. 
 232. See infra text accompanying notes 239–41. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] THE PROBLEMS OF PROBABLE CAUSE 611 
should apply to adults while students are present. However, when students are 
not present at school or when school officials reasonably believe that students 
are not present, such as during weekend parent-teacher conferences, school 
employees have no duty to protect students. Since there is no duty to protect 
students when no students are present, probable cause should apply in these 
circumstances. 
Stefkovich and Miller argue that, just as is the case outside the school 
environment, probable cause should apply unless there are exigent 
circumstances—like a threat of guns or violence—in which case the standard 
would revert to reasonable suspicion.233 The problem with relying on exigent 
circumstances to justify warrantless searches is that it will often call for an 
after-the-fact determination of which standard applies, since it is often unclear 
whether exigent circumstances exist. 
Consider In re Josue T. where the smell of marijuana led to the discovery 
of a firearm in school.234 While the presence of marijuana did not constitute an 
emergency, the presence of a gun certainly did. Or, consider In re William V. 
where the pat down of a student who was displaying a bandanna led to the 
discovery of a knife in school.235 Clearly, the bandanna was harmless, but the 
knife was deadly. 
The point is, sometimes it would be unclear whether exigent circumstances 
exist, so resource officers would often not know which legal standard applies 
to the search. In such cases, the resource officer, who is likely not a criminal 
attorney, must either conduct the search and risk having the evidence 
suppressed at trial, or take the time to apply for a warrant and risk the safety of 
students. 
Others, like Dodd, argue that because statistics indicate that violence in 
schools is declining, then a probable cause standard is sufficient to curb 
violence.236 However, the fact that violence and guns in schools are decreasing 
does not make them absent.237 Rather, “violent crime in the schools . . . [is a] 
major social problem[].”238 Even if there is decreased school violence, it is 
necessary to apply the reasonable suspicion standard to deter students. If 
students know that they can be searched with only reasonable suspicion, they 
will be less likely to carry contraband onto school property. Conversely, if 
students know that a warrant must be obtained before they can be searched, 
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they will be more tempted to bring contraband to school because they would 
have a reduced chance of being caught. 
It is clear that guns, drugs, and violence are an unfortunate part of the 
American school system. It is equally clear that educators and resource officers 
have a legal duty to protect students while in school. A probable cause 
standard would frustrate the fulfillment of the resource officer’s duty, make it 
harder for schools to keep contraband off school property, and make it easier 
for students to conceal drugs or weapons at school. This high standard will not 
mitigate drug and gun problems, but will make them worse. It will force 
educators and resource officers to take the time to apply for a warrant instead 
of immediately addressing a perceived threat—time that in some 
circumstances, could literally be the difference between life and death. 
Reasonable suspicion, though, allows educators and resource officers the 
flexibility to search without wasting time obtaining a warrant, and discourages 
students from bringing contraband to school. As a result, reasonable suspicion 
should apply when no “outside” officers are involved. 
V.  RECOMMENDATION 
The determination of whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
applies when a resource officer searches a student should hinge on a bright-line 
rule that school employees and police officers can easily apply and understand. 
This bright-line rule is necessary because, generally, neither school employees 
nor police officers are trained in the nuances and intricacies of the law.239 A 
bright-line test, then, will allow school employees and officers to know, before 
conducting the search, which standard applies, and will keep them from 
violating the rights of students while enabling them to efficiently disrupt 
criminal activity. As one Delaware court stated, “[U]nlawful police conduct 
will be deterred only if . . . police officers are aware of the standards to which 
they must be held.”240 The same reasoning applies to school employees. 
Additionally, this bright-line rule must be practical. It should not “elevate[] 
form over function” by considering arbitrary factors like who paid the officer’s 
salary or where he was assigned.241 Rather, the focus should be on the role of 
the person conducting the search. 
Therefore, the rule should be based on the In re Josue T. classifications.242 
First, pursuant to T.L.O., reasonable suspicion should apply when school 
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employees conduct a search, and when resource officers search in conjunction 
with school employees.243 It is crucial that resource officers are able to search 
at the request of school employees so as to not “encourage teachers and school 
officials, who generally are untrained in proper pat down procedures . . . to 
conduct a search of a student suspected of carrying a dangerous weapon . . . 
without the assistance of a school liaison officer.”244 Additionally, because 
resource officers can unilaterally search students when they develop reasonable 
suspicion,245 there will be no “silver platter”246 problems where resource 
officers coerce school employees into searching students based on a legal 
standard that does not apply to the officer personally. 
Second, reasonable suspicion should universally apply when a school 
resource officer, acting on his own initiative or under his own authority, 
unilaterally searches a student.247 Reasonable suspicion should apply to 
resource officers because the focus should be on function, not form.248 
Resource officers are fully commissioned law enforcement personnel that are 
often armed and in uniform. However, like traditional school employees, they 
also work full-time in a particular school, and are responsible for maintaining a 
safe, secure, and orderly learning environment for students.249 In this way, 
resource officers function more like school employees and less like “outside” 
police. This rule is also justified because schools are special due to the school’s 
custodial responsibility for students.250 Because of this, and the fact that for 
their own good, students are “routinely required [to do a variety of things],” 
they enjoy fewer rights while in school and should be subject to searches based 
only on reasonable suspicion developed unilaterally by resource officers.251 
Finally, probable cause should apply when “outside” police officers initiate 
their own search, or when school employees or resource officers search at the 
behest of such “outside” officers. These “outside” officers are different 
because, unlike resource officers, they do not work full-time in the unique 
school setting and are not responsible for maintaining an orderly educational 
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environment. Because they have no connection to, or responsibility for, the 
school environment (other than the presence of the school in the city the officer 
serves), the necessity for quick action that applies to resource officers does not 
apply to their “outside” counterparts. Additionally, because probable cause 
applies to “outside” officers, they should not be permitted to ask school 
employees or resource officers to search students. If they could request 
searches, “outside” officers would be tempted to ask school employees or 
resource officers to search with the lower reasonable suspicion standard, then 
hand the evidence over on a “silver platter.”252 
When students are on an off-campus field trip, either resource officers or 
“outside” police could potentially search students. Resource officers should not 
need probable cause, because as agents or contractors of the school, they have 
a legal duty to protect students and maintain a safe educational environment. 
“Outside” police, however, have no legal duty specifically to students, or to the 
educational environment. As a result, just as under In re Josue T.’s third 
category, “outside” police should develop probable cause before searching, 
even if students are off-campus during the school day. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note does not seek to encourage the suppression of individual rights, 
liberty, or autonomy. There is no question that “students do not shed their 
constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”253 However, while society 
protects the rights of students, it must not forget to also protect their health and 
safety. American schools are experiencing substantial gun, violence, and drug 
problems that have no end in sight. It is the legal duty of schools and school 
resource officers to identify and resolve these problems—something they 
cannot do without the flexibility to quickly intervene and resolve dangerous 
situations. If probable cause were the standard, teachers and resource officers 
would be forced to apply for a search warrant to search students. 
Unfortunately, the time this would take could be the difference between life 
and death for students. With the reasonable suspicion standard, though, like 
what happened in In re Josue T. and In re William V., schools will be safer 
because teachers and resource officers will be able to respond quickly and 
prevent violence before it occurs. 
This standard does not reduce or suppress the Fourth Amendment rights of 
students. One must remember that students, by their very nature, have limited 
rights while in school. They must attend school, even if they object. Their First 
Amendment rights are significantly restricted while in school, and their Second 
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Amendment rights are also extinguished. Additionally, their Fourth 
Amendment rights are limited according to T.L.O., at least when school 
officials conduct a search or seizure. Applying reasonable suspicion, even to 
school resource officers who are agents or contractors of the school, is merely 
consistent with the other rights that students enjoy while in school. 
Because Meneese is a category one or two case, the court should have 
applied the reasonable suspicion standard and affirmed Meneese’s conviction 
for carrying a dangerous weapon at school. The search was justified at its 
inception because the officer caught Meneese with marijuana in plain view, 
and with a padlocked backpack. It was permissible in scope because the search 
was limited to where the officer reasonably believed contraband was hidden. 
However, with essentially no justification, the court applied probable cause 
and departed from the clear trend of cases that apply reasonable suspicion to 
school resource officers. Because the court did not clearly indicate the breadth 
of its holding, the case will generate confusion among judges, school 
administrators, and school resource officers—they will not know which 
standard applies. Until the court clarifies the rule, when school resource 
officers in Washington become suspicious of a student, they must decide 
which is the lesser of two evils: search the student and risk having the evidence 
suppressed or the conviction reversed, or apply for a warrant and hope the 
officer’s suspicion does not come to fruition while the application is being 
processed. A better approach is to create a bright-line rule that every judge, 
school administrator, teacher, and resource officer can know and understand: 
reasonable suspicion applies in all category one and two cases, while probable 
cause applies in all category three cases. 
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